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 supra, at 1228-34 (describing the 
decreased use of shaming punishments as colonial 
communities grew in size thereby increasing the likelihood 
that the offender was a stranger to the witnesses of his 
punishment); see also Dan M. Kahan, What do Alternative 
Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591, 631 (1996) ("Early 
Americans turned to imprisonment in large part because 
they believed that existing criminal penalties had lost the 
power to shame.").8 Moreover, as noted above, central to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. I rely here on the type of information released pursuant to the 
Attorney General's guidelines implementing notification. See N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:7-8(d) (1995). I assume that the guidelines accurately reflect 
the legislative purpose in this respect. 
 
7. Contrary to the majority's assertions, there is no evidence of which I 
am aware that a colonial settlement would have known prior to the 
shaming itself of an offender's crime. I suspect that if the community 
was already aware of the crime, then shaming punishments would be 
unnecessarily duplicative. 
 
8. In an interesting, perhaps ironic twist, the need for notification 
provisions arises because of the "anonymity afforded by modern society." 
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many of the shaming punishments was some notice-- e.g., 
a sign, a label, or a brand -- of the offense(s) for which the 
offender was being punished. 
 
In contrast, warning or wanted posters and quarantine 
notices do not disseminate the same type of information 
disseminated by notification provisions. A warning or 
wanted poster, displayed in an effort to catch escaped 
prisoners or to arrest alleged criminals, obviously does not 
include information about the location of the offender's 
current dwelling, nor of his current employment. If the 
authorities had this information, they would know how to 
apprehend the offender. Such posters also typically include 
information about the facts of the individual's escape in the 
case of a warning poster, and the facts of the individual's 
alleged crime in the case of a wanted poster. Quarantine 
notices, too, include information different from that 
included in notification provisions. The most prominent 
difference is that quarantine notices include health-related 
information; such notices make no mention of criminal or 
alleged criminal activity. Information provided pursuant to 
notification, then, links the registrant to some act for which 
he is blameworthy. Health related information is normally 
not related to culpability. 
 
The state attempts to distinguish the notification 
provisions from the shaming punishments in terms of the 
scope of the notification. New Jersey makes much of the 
fact that the notification provisions, unlike the shaming 
punishments, do not involve the dissemination of 
information to the entire community. I believe that the state 
overstates the significance of this difference. Though 
notification under both Tier 2 and Tier 3 is intended to be 
limited, the design of the provisions seems to encourage 
more widespread dissemination. Tier 3 recipients are not 
warned that the information is confidential. Tier 2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Recent Legislation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 787, 790 (1995) (discussing the 
Washington state sex offender notification statute). Piercing the veil of 
modern anonymity may serve remedial purposes, such as alerting the 
community to the risk that a convicted sex offender who resides nearby 
may re-offend, but it also may serve punitive purposes, such as 
providing the community a target for harassment.' 
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recipients are so warned, but I fail to see how that warning 
is to be taken seriously. Under Tier 2, notification is given 
to the staff of organizations charged with the care or 
supervision of children and/or women. Such notification 
would effect the remedial purpose of the statute-- the 
protection of the children and women under the care of the 
organizations -- only if the organizations pass the 
notification information to the children and women under 
their care. 
 
New Jersey also emphasizes that notification is tailored 
to the specific offender and may not occur at all. In 
emphasizing this aspect of notification, the state fails to 
appreciate fully the textured nuances of the shaming 
punishments. Shaming punishments were also tailored to 
the specific offender and often did not occur at all. For 
instance, permanent labeling and branding were reserved 
for offenders whose likelihood of re-offense was high. See 
Friedman, supra at 40. Only the "deep-dyed sinner" would 
suffer such a fate. Id. Further, shaming punishments were 
by no means automatic; not all offenders would be so 
punished. Fines or bonds for good behavior (payments 
made to the authorities that were forfeited should the 
surety commit a misdeed within a certain time period) were 
common punishments for lesser offenses. See Hirsch, supra 
at 1224. And, even for more serious offenses, an offender 
could often simply pay a fine and avoid a shaming 
punishment altogether. See Friedman, supra at 38 
(describing the punishment for a woman who struck her 
husband as either half an hour at a town meeting with her 
offense written on her forehead or the payment of a fine to 
the county). 
 
5. Summary: Shaming Punishments as the Best Analogy 
 
In sum, the foregoing analysis demonstrates that the 
closest historical analogues to the notification provisions of 
Megan's Law are the shaming punishments, which were 
traditionally considered punitive.9 Like the shaming 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. It is interesting to note that in recent years courts nationwide have 
returned to versions of the colonial shaming punishments. See Kahan, 
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punishments, notification is carried out by the state. In 
that sense, notification is unlike measures in which the 
state merely allows private individuals or entities to access 
information and then allows those individuals to release 
that information more broadly. Moreover, like the shaming 
punishments, notification provides the community with 
information about the registrant's identity and physical 
description, place of residence, place of employment, and 
criminal history. Such information is judicially endorsed. 
The information provided by notification is different from 
that provided by warning or wanted posters, which do not 
provide information about residence and employment, and 
quarantine notices, which do not provide information about 
criminal history; none of this information is judicially 
endorsed. Above all notification is the functional equivalent 
of shaming punishments; notification publishes information 
about the registrant calculated to reach the entire 
community and likely to lead to public opprobrium. 
 
D. Does the Text, Legislative History, or Design of 
the Notification Provisions Demonstrate That 
They are not Punitive? 
 
1. Introduction; The Role of Law Enforcement 
 
Under Artway, the notification provisions must be 
considered punishment provided the text or legislative 
history does not demonstrate that they are not punitive. I 
therefore turn to the question whether the text or legislative 
history so demonstrates. This part of the analysis requires 
an examination of the actual operation or design of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
supra, at 631-34. Courts might require individuals to wear t-shirts or 
bracelets announcing their crime, to post placards on their houses or 
bumper stickers on their cars, to stand in public places wearing signs, 
or to apologize publicly to the community or their victims. See id. at 632- 
34. The actual, stated purpose of these measures is punitive; in that 
sense, they differ from Megan's Law. However, these measures suggest a 
shared cultural understanding, still prevalent in our society, that 
publicity concerning an individual's misdeeds can, and often is, intended 
to punish that individual. 
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measure at issue. See Hendricks, 65 U.S.L.W. at 4568-70 
(examining the design of the Kansas civil commitment 
statute). It is an inquiry focused on the question whether 
the legislature designed the statutory scheme in such a 
manner so as "to contradict the historical understanding of 
[the measure] as punishment." Austin v. United States, 509 
U.S. 602, 619 (1993). 
 
Perhaps the most striking feature of the statutory design 
is its placement of the tier classification determination and 
of the notification process squarely within the criminal 
justice system. The chapter that contains the registration 
and notification provisions is contained in the state's Code 
of Criminal Justice. Cf. Hendricks, 65 U.S.L.W. at 4568 
(relying in part on the decision by the state of Kansas to 
place its Sexually Violent Predator Act within the probate 
code, instead of the criminal code, to conclude that the 
challenged measure was not a criminal proceeding). It is 
the Attorney General of New Jersey, a law enforcement 
officer, who is charged with "promulgat[ing] guidelines and 
procedures for the notification required" by Megan's Law. 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:7-8(a) (1995). 
 
The guidelines are to be formulated with the advice of a 
"notification advisory council" comprised, at least in part, of 
professionals from various fields outside of official law 
enforcement, but the professionals are all involved, at least 
to some degree, in the criminal justice system, broadly 
defined, and this council provides, as its name suggests, 
mere recommendations. See id. § 2C:7-11. Once in place, 
the guidelines are to be implemented by the county 
prosecutors: they determine the risk that a particular 
offender poses for re-offending, thereby setting the tier 
classification, and they determine the means of providing 
notification. See id. § 2C:7-8(d). 
 
As the guidelines are currently written, the county 
prosecutors have significant leeway both in determining the 
appropriate tier classification and in fashioning the proper 
notification plan. Application of the Registrant Risk 
Assessment Scale is by no means ministerial; the county 
prosecutors must determine whether the particular offender 
poses a low, moderate, or high risk to the community for 
each factor in the Scale. Although the Scale provides 
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guidance to the prosecutors making this determination, it 
does not eliminate from the process prosecutorial 
evaluation. The guidelines allow prosecutors to enlist the 
assistance of persons outside the prosecutor's office, such 
as social workers or psychologists. However, the guidelines 
leave formulation of the notification to the considered 
judgment of the county prosecutors. It is up to those law 
enforcement officials to ensure that the notification is 
properly tailored to reach those at risk of being victimized 
by the particular offender. 
 
Finally, law enforcement officers, whether of the 
municipality in which the offender intends to reside or of 
the state police force, provide the actual notification. See id. 
§§ 2C:7-6, 2C:7-7. 
 
2. Promoting the Aims of Punishment 
 
The operation of the statute will, moreover, promote"the 
traditional aims of punishment -- retribution and 
deterrence." Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 
168 (1963); see Hendricks, 65 U.S.L.W. at 4568 ("As a 
threshold matter, commitment under the Act does not 
implicate either of the two primary objectives of criminal 
punishment -- retribution or deterrence."). Of course, 
simply because a measure has the effect of promoting 
retribution and deterrence does not necessarily mean that 
its purpose was to do so. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1255. 
Still, such an effect suggests that the particular measure 
was not designed in a way that contradicts the historical 
understanding of its analogues as punitive. That the 
notification provisions of Megan's Law promote retribution 
and deterrence is demonstrated as follows. 
 
By publicizing an offender's crime to the community, 
notification realizes justice, see id. (explaining that 
retribution "does not seek to affect future conduct or solve 
any problem except realizing `justice' "), in that it inflicts 
suffering on the offender. It is undisputed that notification 
results in shaming the offender, thereby effecting some 
amount of retribution. This suffering "serves as a threat of 
negative repercussions [thereby] discourag[ing] people from 
engaging in certain behavior." Id. It is, therefore, also a 
 
                                86 
deterrent. There is no disputing this deterrent signal; the 
notification provisions are triggered by behavior that is 
already a crime, suggesting that those who consider 
engaging in such behavior should beware. See Doe v. 
Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("The Act is 
designed in such a fashion as to suggest that it is punitive. 
It contains classic indicia of a punitive scheme. Its 





The design inquiry is also furthered by an analysis of 
whether the notification provisions are excessive in relation 
to their stated remedial purpose. In a several important 
respects, they are. First, the criminal acts that, pursuant to 
Megan's Law, trigger registration and potentially subject an 
offender to notification, are over-broad. For example, 
kidnapping, even without a concomitant sexual offense, 
triggers notification, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:13-1(c)(2)(c); 
so, too, does consensual sexual contact that is criminalized 
merely because of the age of one of the participants, see, 
e.g., id. § 2C:14-2(a)(1), (b), (c)(5). See Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. 
Supp. at 623-24 (describing New York's Megan's Law as 
excessive because it covers individuals such as a "21-year 
old who engages in sexual intercourse with a 16-year old 
(who is not a spouse)," a person who engages in incest, and 
a person who restrains another under the age of 17); 
Kansas v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1042-43 (Kan. 1996) 
(describing Kansas's Megan's Law as excessive because 
"[s]everal of the listed felonies [triggering registration and 
notification] include what otherwise might be viewed as 
voluntary sexual contact between two persons that is 
considered criminal because of the minority status of the 
victim and the fact that the victim is not married to the 
accused"). 
 
Next, notification under Tier 3 is often provided to those 
who simply do not need to know that there is a released sex 
offender nearby. Tier 3 notification is to be provided to 
"members of the public likely to encounter the person 
registered." N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:7-8(c)(3) (1995). But the 
"likely to encounter" standard does not limit notification to 
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vulnerable populations. It is a standard based largely on 
geographic proximity, see Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 385 
(N.J. 1995), rather than whether the recipient of 
notification needs protection (e.g., a child) or can protect 
others (e.g., a parent). Under the statute, a move by a 
registrant into a retirement community will trigger 
notification of his neighbors.10 
 
Similarly, the type of information required to be provided 
by the guidelines is excessive; it is information individual 
recipients often simply do not need to know. Individuals 
who receive notification learn of an offender's place of 
residence and his place of employment, regardless of their 
relative locations. If an offender does not work at a location 
near to his place of residence, which I suspect is not 
uncommon, then such information is only in part useful for 
protection. A recipient of notification who lives, attends 
school, works, or is otherwise located near to an offender's 
place of residence should be little concerned about the 
location of the offender's place of employment (and vice 
versa). Knowing the offender's place of residence might 
lessen the risk that the recipient will become a victim of the 
released offender; he or she can avoid the offender's house, 
for example. But, knowing the offender's distant place of 
employment offers no protective assistance to the recipient. 
If the person is not likely to encounter the offender at the 
offender's place of employment (or place of residence), why 
would he or she need or want to know such information? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The guidelines written to implement Megan's Law may be interpreted 
to warn against this very problem. They suggest that the law 
enforcement officials responsible for implementing the notification tailor 
such notification so that it reaches only those at risk. However, the 
examples provided by the guidelines suggest limitations on the type of 
recipient organizations, not on recipient individuals. Moreover, the 
guidelines stress that, notwithstanding this suggested tailoring, 
geographic proximity remains the critical factor in determining the scope 
of notification. Additionally, once the information is released, there is no 
practical means of limiting its further distribution. See Kansas v. Myers, 
923 P.2d 1024, 1041 (Kan. 1996) ("The print or broadcast media could 
make it a practice of publishing the list [of released sex offenders] as 
often as they chose. Anyone could distribute leaflets containing the 
registered information anywhere and anytime."). 
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4. Summary of "Design" 
 
In sum, the design of the notification provisions does not 
contradict the historical understanding of analogues to 
such provisions as punitive. Notification is placed in New 
Jersey's criminal code and is structured and carried out by 
state law enforcement officials. Further, notification 
promotes the aims of retribution and deterrence. Finally, in 
important respects, notification is excessive. The particular 
recipients who receive notification and the type of 
information they receive are not carefully tailored to the 
remedial goals notification is intended to serve. 
 
E. Notification Fails the History Subpart of Artway 
 
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, the proper 
historical analogues to the notification provisions of 
Megan's Law are the shaming punishments of colonial 
America. Clearly punitive, such punishments evidence an 
objective punitive purpose for the notification provisions. 
Because the design of the notification provisions-- 
especially the placement of the provisions in the state 
criminal code and the placement of the responsibility of 
enforcing them with law enforcement officials, the 
excessiveness of their operation, and their promotion of 
retribution and deterrence -- does not negate this objective 
punitive purpose. Therefore, I believe Megan's Law fails the 
history subpart of the second prong of the Artway test and 
should be considered punishment. As a result, the 
judgment of the district court should be reversed. This 
conclusion is buttressed by my discussion infra  at Part II.C. 
of the extent to which, by reason of the network of Megan's 
Laws throughout the nation, notification is akin to 
banishment, another traditional colonial measure in the 
nature of punishment. See supra, at Part I.C.2.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Because of my conclusion as to the history subpart of the Artway 
test, I need not examine in detail the other subparts of the objective 
purpose prong of the test. I mention them here only briefly. First, though 
it is a very close question, I doubt that the notification provisions of 
Megan's Law, as I have described their design, can be explained solely by 
a remedial purpose. Second, because, as I have discussed, the 
traditional understanding of historical analogues to the notification 
 





The final prong of the Artway test concerns the actual 
effects of the challenged measure. According to Artway, "[i]f 
the negative repercussions -- regardless of how they are 
justified -- are great enough, the measure must be 
considered punishment." Artway, 81 F.3d at 1263.12 The 
analysis required under this part of the test is one of 
degree, and is guided by the signposts of already decided 
cases. See id. 
 
The conclusions I have already reached -- that Megan's 
Law fails the objective purpose prong of the Artway test 
and must, therefore, be considered punitive -- might make 
it unnecessary for me to reach the "effects" issue. However, 
because of the relevance of the effects to application of the 
clearest proof standard on which the majority relies, see 
infra Part III, because I believe that the majority's effects 
analysis is seriously flawed, and also because the 
enormous importance of the case counsels that I explain 
why, I discuss the effects of the notification provisions. As 
I will demonstrate, the majority, in undertaking its own 
analysis, narrows the test fashioned in Artway . It does so 
without support, and, given the tenor of the analysis, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
provisions and the design of Megan's Law evidence an objective 
retributive purpose, the third subpart of the objective purpose prong is 
not implicated. In other words, the third subpart of the objective purpose 
prong applies only "if the legislature did not intend a law to be 
retributive but did intend it to serve some mixture of deterrent and 
salutary [remedial] purposes." Artway , 81 F.3d at 1263. Here, such a 
retributive purpose existed. 
 
12. Holding that the retroactive cancellation of early release credits 
earned by prison inmates violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, the 
Supreme Court examined the actual effect of the legislation at issue 
without concern for the stated legislative purpose. See Lynce v. Mathis, 
___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 891, 896-98 (1997). In so doing, the Court 
reaffirmed its approach in California Department of Corrections v. 
Morales, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 1597 (1995), on which Artway based 
the effects prong of its test. See Lynce, 117 S. Ct. at 897. 
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unnecessarily. I also identify problems with its substantive 
discussion. 
 
B. Methodology: The Proper Standard for 
Evaluating Effects 
 
To begin, I quote from the majority's opinion: "It 
necessarily follows that some limit must be placed on the 
situations in which a measure's sting alone, despite its 
remedial purpose and effect, will constitute punishment 
under those clauses and that classification as punishment 
on the basis of sting alone must be reserved for cases 
involving deprivation of the interests most highly valued in 
our constitutional republic. . . . Interests such as these are 
sufficiently fundamental to our constitutionally secured 
liberty that state interference with them can be justified 
only by the most important of state interests." With the 
second sentence, the majority states that the line marking 
the boundary between a non-punitive and a punitive 
measure varies according to the remedial interest sought to 
be served by the measure. In other words, it appears that 
the majority is holding that the more important the 
remedial interest served by a particular measure the more 
harsh the sting of the measure's effects may be before the 
measure is classified as punitive. Nothing in Artway (or, for 
that matter, in the Supreme Court jurisprudence on which 
it draws) suggests such a formulation of the effects prong. 
To the contrary, Artway posits that a particular sting either 
falls on the punishment side of the line or it does not. At 
issue here is the particular sting, not the particular 
remedial interest. 
 
The majority has thus introduced a difficult-to-apply 
sliding scale into an already complex test. This needless 
complication would render it nearly impossible to determine 
whether a particular sting is punishment. For example, as 
we know from Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898), 
the revocation of a license to practice one's profession is not 
considered punishment. However, could such a revocation 
be punishment if the remedial interest served by the 
challenged measure is relatively unimportant? If so, at what 
point does the importance of the remedial interests render 
such a revocation non-punitive? Under the majority's 
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reading of Artway, an analysis of the effects prong requires 
a two-track inquiry, guided only by a few fixed points. I fear 
that this amorphous inquiry might lead to an elusive or 
protean jurisprudence, something to be avoided. 
 
Moreover, because the other prongs of the Artway  test 
adequately stir into the mix the remedial interests served 
by the particular measure, we need not examine those 
interests under the effects prong. The actual purpose prong 
examines whether the legislature subjectively intended the 
measure to advance remedial interests. All three subparts 
of the objective purpose prong require the reviewing court, 
to some degree, to consider the remedial interests the 
legislature subjectively believed it was advancing by 
enacting the challenged measure. Considering the stated 
remedial purpose under the effects prong might over- 
emphasize that stated purpose, thereby potentially allowing 
diversion of attention from the actual operation of the 
measure. 
 
The majority also narrows the Artway test by requiring 
that, at a minimum, a challenged measure act to deprive 
affected persons of a sufficiently fundamental interest before 
that measure is considered to cause punitive effects. The 
majority offers no support for this proposition in either logic 
or precedent, and I am unaware of any. Nothing in Artway 
(or, for that matter, in the Supreme Court jurisprudence on 
which it draws) suggests such a formulation of the effects 
prong. In addition, at least as I read the majority's opinion, 
defining the effects prong in this manner is unnecessary to 
the result. The majority apparently believes that the effects 
caused by notification simply are not harsh enough to 
classify Megan's Law as punitive. Under my reading of 
Artway, satisfaction of the effects prong does not require 
overcoming such a difficult hurdle. 
 
I am especially concerned in this regard because of the 
indefiniteness of the majority's formulation. It is not 
apparent to me what would constitute a "sufficiently 
fundamental interest." Furthermore, without a clear 
understanding of those interests the deprivation of which 
might constitute punishment, I am also unsure as to 
whether the majority adequately defines the universe of 
interests that it, or I, would deem worthy of protection. In 
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short, I fear that the majority might have left too little room 
to deal with unforeseen cases in this difficult area of 
jurisprudence. 
 
In addition to re-formulating the Artway test, the 
majority also treats the effects of notification in such a 
manner as to minimize the impact of those effects. First, it 
emphasizes that the effects of which the offenders complain 
-- e.g., isolation, public humiliation, loss of employment 
opportunities, and physical violence -- are indirect. 
Although I agree that such is the case, I remonstrate 
against what seems to be overemphasis upon that aspect of 
notification for, in itself, indirectness of effects is not 
dispositive. 
 
The Supreme Court addressed the question of directness 
in California Department of Corrections v. Morales, ___ U.S. 
___, 115 S. Ct. 1597 (1995), the very case on which Artway 
bases the effects prong of its test. The Court struggled with 
the question whether a change in the procedures governing 
parole suitability hearings would effect an impact on a 
prisoner's expected term of confinement. See id. at 1602- 
05. In concluding that the measure did not constitute 
punishment, the Court determined that the changes in the 
relevant procedures "create[d] only the most speculative 
and attenuated possibility of producing the prohibited effect 
of increasing the measure of punishment for covered 
crimes." Id. at 1603. The Court made plain, however, that 
even the indirect effects of a measure could render it 
punitive. 
 
Here, the indirect effects of notification are neither 
"speculative" nor "attenuated." In fact, notification advances 
the stated remedial purposes of Megan's Law only insofar 
as it induces many of these indirect effects. For example, 
public safety is enhanced if potential victims of an offender 
are warned to avoid him, thereby isolating him from the 
larger community. If the legislature were not aware that at 
least partial isolation would necessarily result from 
notification, I doubt that it would have believed that 
notification would serve the remedial purposes it sought to 
advance. And, although not necessarily vital in ensuring 
the efficacy of Megan's Law, other indirect effects -- e.g., 
harassment, loss of employment opportunities, and 
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physical violence -- surely were anticipated as also being 
inevitable. New Jersey was not the first state to adopt 
notification provisions, and the experiences of other states 
must have informed the New Jersey legislature as it 
considered Megan's Law. 
 
In other states, notification has caused harassment, loss 
of job opportunities, and the like. A study by the 
Washington State Institute for Public Policy, released in 
December 1993 (approximately ten months prior to the 
enactment of Megan's Law), reported numerous instances 
of harassment following notification in Washington, some 
quite severe, under its 1990 Community Protection Act. See 
Sheila Donnelly & Roxanne Lieb, Community Notification: A 
Survey of Law Enforcement 7 (1993). In short, most of the 
indirect effects of notification are expected and foreseeable. 
 
The second manner in which the majority minimizes the 
impact of the effects of notification is by separating the 
analysis into two distinct parts. It first examines the effect 
of notification on the reputational interests of the offender; 
then it examines the effect of notification on the increased 
risk of physical violence. The majority concludes that each 
of these effects, by itself, does not produce a sting harsh 
enough to classify notification as punishment. It fails, 
however, to determine whether these effects, if examined 
together, are sufficiently harsh. The difference between 
these two approaches is manifest. Individual effects each 
might produce only a moderate sting; adding together these 
little stings might, however, produce a great big sting. In 
the real world, it is the total sting that the recipient feels. 
It is not clear why the majority chose not to add these 
stings together. And, at least from my reading of Artway, 
there is no justification for choosing not to do so. Rather, 
I believe that Artway (and Morales) require an analysis of 
all the effects of a measure, provided they are not too 
speculative or attenuated, and here they are not. 
 
C. Actual Effects 
 
Turning from methodology to substance, I first note my 
agreement with the majority's identification of the effects 
caused by notification as including isolation, harassment, 
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loss of employment and housing opportunities, damage to 
property, and physical violence.13 
 
As is clear from the majority's description of the effects of 
notification, the burden imposed by the collective weight of 
all of these effects is borne by the offender in all aspects of 
his life. At worst, the offender is literally cut off from any 
interaction with the wider community. He is unable to find 
work or a home, cannot socialize, and is subject to violence 
or at least the constant threat of violence. At best, he must 
labor within significant confinements. Although perhaps 
some people will hire him or rent him a home, his social 
intercourse with others is all but non-existent. The effects 
of notification permeate his entire existence. See Doe v. 
Gregoire, 960 F. Supp. 1478, 1486 (W.D. Wash. 1997) 
("[H]ere the punitive effects are dominant and 
inescapable."); Roe v. Office of Adult Probation, 938 F. Supp. 
1080, 1092 (D. Conn. 1996) ("Notification is an affirmative 
placement by the State of a form of public stigma on Roe, 
and this stigma by its very nature pervades into every 
aspect of an offender's life."). And, although the majority's 
opinion is eminently fair, I think that it understates the 
effects of notification provisions. Throughout the nation, 
there are continual reports of harassment, threats, 
isolation, and violence. In the margin, I mention some of 
the most recent occurrences.14 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. I recognize that analysis of the notification provisions presents 
potentially difficult causation questions. For example, given that criminal 
history information is publicly available, it is not clear whether the 
harassment to which a released offender might be subject is caused by 
government notification or by the general availability of such 
information. It could well be that (and the record indicates instances in 
which) a community becomes aware of the presence of a released 
offender through the media. That said, the very fact that the state 
believes it important to notify persons about the location of a sex 
offender could both drive these media reports and spur local 
communities into action. In such event, notification could be 
characterized as a cause of these effects. 
 
14. In California, where the information about released sex offenders can 
be accessed on CD-ROM, a released offender's car wasfirebombed. See 
Carolyne Zinko, Flyers Falsely Call Artist a Molester, S.F. Chron., July 
14, 1997, at A1. Reaction to notification is often swift; another report 
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Although the question is very close, I believe that there is 
a strong argument that the harshness of the effects of 
notification are closer to imprisonment and revocation of 
citizenship than to a loss of a profession or of benefits. Like 
imprisonment and the revocation of citizenship, notification 
is all-pervasive. In that sense, the offender has almost no 
refuge from the sometimes severe effects of notification. He 
may seek to move to another state, but the majority of 
states has some form of community notification. He could, 
perhaps, move out of the country to avoid this network of 
domestic Megan's Laws. At the extreme, then, notification 
has become, at least for that offender, akin to banishment. 
See Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 626 ("Notification 
statutes have resulted in the banishment of sex offenders 
both literally and psychologically."). This pervasive aspect of 
notification differentiates it from the loss of employment 
opportunities and the loss of benefits.15 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
from California notes that a neighborhood organized a protest within one 
day of receiving notification in order to drive the released offender from 
the community. See Bonnie Hayes & Frank Messina, Few Turn Out for 
Megan's Law Viewing in O.C., L.A. Times, July 2, 1997, at A1. Further, 
the community reaction does not easily wane. In New York, two 
neighbors of a sex offender protested in front of his house for months in 
an effort to force him to leave. See Today (NBC television broadcast, 
June 24, 1997). Even those who have endeavored to help reintegrate 
released sex offenders into the community have been thwarted; in some 
areas, local churches have been unable to assist offenders because 
individual congregants have made it impossible for the offenders to stay 
in the flock. See Lisa Richardson, Megan's Law is Put to Test as Towns 
Bounce Child Molesters, L.A. Times, May 25, 1997, at A3. In fact, so 
potent a weapon is notification, that there are reports of false 
notifications, presumably initiated by private individuals intent on 
carrying out a personal vendetta. See Zinko, supra, at A1. 
 
15. In both De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (plurality opinion), 
and Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898), the Supreme Court held 
that the loss of certain employment opportunities did not constitute 
punishment. However, the loss of such opportunities was limited; in De 
Veau, the relevant statute forbade a felon from work as a union official, 
see De Veau, 363 U.S. at 145, and in Hawker , the relevant statute 
forbade a felon from practicing medicine, see Hawker, 170 U.S. at 190. 
In neither case did the statute limit all employment opportunities. 
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Perhaps the most difficult question in this context is 
whether notification is fairly considered punishment when 
civil commitment -- a form of involuntary confinement -- is 
not. In Hendricks the Supreme Court held that a state 
statute allowing the confinement of convicted sex offenders 
after the expiration of their prison term did not constitute 
punishment. Important to the Court was the traditional 
understanding of civil commitment as non-punitive. But 
beyond that distinction, I note two respects in which 
notification under Megan's Law may be considered more 
harsh than the civil commitment statute at issue in 
Hendricks. 
 
First, anyone confined under the Kansas statute was 
afforded some form of treatment if such was possible. See 
Hendricks, 65 U.S.L.W. at 4569-70. No such treatment is 
available to those subject to notification under Megan's 
Law, and there is at least some evidence in the record that 
the isolation engendered by notification may in fact cause 
some offenders to recidivate. See Prentky Aff. ¶ 4, 
Appellants' App. at 189; see also Doe v. Pataki , 940 F. 
Supp. at 628. Thus, the effects of civil confinement might 
be rehabilitative, while those of notification are exactly the 
contrary. Second, the Kansas statute required a yearly 
reevaluation of the confined offender. See Hendricks, 65 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
In Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), the Supreme Court held 
that the loss of social security benefits did not constitute punishment. In 
the context of the particular statute, however, the sting of that loss is 
not as sharp as might be supposed initially. First, the spouse of the 
beneficiary might still be eligible for benefits. See id. at 606 n.2. Second, 
the loss is triggered by deportation from the United States. See id. at 
604-05 & n.1. There is no indication whether the deportee might be 
eligible for similar benefits in the country to which he is deported. Thus, 
the loss of social security benefits in this context does not necessarily 
render the affected individual destitute or without assistance; he has 
other places to turn. 
 
In a similar vein, we have recently held that the eviction of a tenant 
from public housing because of a drug offense is not punitive, see Taylor 
v. Cisneros, 102 F.3d 1334, 1341-1344 (3d Cir. 1996), but such an 
eviction did not prevent the affected individual from obtaining housing 
elsewhere. 
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U.S.L.W. at 4569. The registration and notification 
provisions in Megan's Law are applicable for at least fifteen 
years. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:7-2(f) (1995). It is possible, 
then, that the sting of notification will last far longer than 




In sum, although I do not rely on my analysis of the 
effects prong of the Artway test to support my ultimate 
conclusion, I note that the majority's discussion of effects is 
seriously flawed in terms of both procedure and substance, 
casting further doubt upon the judgment and shoring up 
still further my dissenting posture. The majority improperly 
and unnecessarily narrows the effects prong of Artway by 
requiring that a measure deprive an individual of a 
constitutionally secured fundamental right and by 
examining the effects in isolated groupings. Finally, its 
substantive discussion of actual effects is, in important 
respects, flawed. 
 
III. THE "CLEAREST PROOF" DOCTRINE 
 
The majority's most serious challenge to my position 
inheres in its argument, citing Hendricks and referring to 
Ursery, that only the "clearest proof" will negate 
congressional intent to deem a measure non-punitive. In 
terms of the Artway test, then, the majority effectively holds 
that should a measure be considered non-punitive under 
the test's first (actual purpose) prong, then there is a strong 
presumption that the measure is non-punitive, and only 
the clearest proof as to the second (objective purpose) and 
third (effects) prongs of the test will overcome that 
presumption. I am unpersuaded. First, the etiology of the 
"clearest proof" doctrine is such that I doubt that the 
Supreme Court would apply it in this context with such 
clear and direct historical antecedents, so plainly punitive 
in character, to the community notification provisions of 
Megan's Law. Second, even if the standard were applied 
here, I believe that the historical context of notification, the 
design of Megan's Law, and the effects resulting therefrom, 
provide sufficiently clear proof of objective intent to negate 
remedial purpose. 
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The clearest proof standard was first articulated in 
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). In Flemming, the 
Supreme Court addressed a contention that the legislative 
history and design of a statute that allowed the Secretary of 
Health, Education, and Welfare to terminate Social Security 
benefits payable to aliens deported due to their political 
affiliations evidenced a punitive congressional intent that 
negated a stated remedial intent. The Court stated: 
 
We observe initially that only the clearest proof could 
suffice to establish the unconstitutionality of a statute 
on such a ground. Judicial inquiries into Congressional 
motives are at best a hazardous matter, and when that 
inquiry seeks to go behind objective manifestations it 
becomes a dubious affair indeed. Moreover, the 
presumption of constitutionality with which this 
enactment, like any other, comes to us forbids us 
lightly to choose that reading of the statute's setting 
which will invalidate it over that which will save it. 
 
Id. at 617. 
 
The Court has since employed the clearest proof standard 
in at least six cases. In Communist Party of the United 
States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 
(1961), the Court considered whether, despite manifest 
congressional intent to the contrary, a measure was 
actually intended to outlaw the Communist Party. The 
Court stated that only the clearest proof would negate that 
congressional intent. In United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 
242 (1980), the Court required the clearest proof that, 
despite the manifest intent to create a civil proceeding, a 
fine under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was 
nevertheless a criminal proceeding. In United States v. One 
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984), and in 
Ursery, the Court applied the clearest proof standard to 
determine whether civil forfeiture statutes were punitive. 
Examining the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, the 
Court in Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986), stated that 
only the clearest proof would negate the legislative intent 
that proceedings determining whether an individual should 
be committed to psychiatric care were civil in nature. 
Finally, and most recently, in Hendricks, the Court used 
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the clearest proof standard in the context of a challenge to 
a civil commitment statute. 
 
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly applied the 
clearest proof standard in the context of challenges alleging 
that subjective legislative intent is different from objective 
legislative intent, I am unwilling to apply the clearest proof 
standard in this context, at least until the Supreme Court 
makes it clear that doing so is appropriate. The clearest 
proof standard creates a nearly irrebuttable presumption 
that favors subjective legislative intent over objective 
manifestations of that intent. In an excess of caution, I 
eschew exploration of the extent to which such a 
presumption can create incentives for legislatures to 
obscure their actual intent with subjective intent, rendering 
it unwise to employ it in certain circumstance. The purpose 
of the "clearest proof" exercise is to provide a technique to 
determine legislative intent. This technique is unnecessary 
here, where, as I have explained, notification measures are 
so plainly the direct descendants of historical punitive 
schemes. It seems to me, moreover, that something more 
than subjective intent alone must be shown to abrogate the 
historical understanding that notification measures are 
punitive. In other words, a legislature's simply denying that 
it is operating outside of a shared cultural tradition does 
not make it so. 
 
This argument may be illuminated by flipping the coin 
over, as it were, and looking at the issue by assuming that 
the clearest proof standard applies in this case. In such 
event, I believe that such proof exists. At the threshold, I 
warn against placing too much emphasis on the meaning of 
"clearest proof." As Flemming and its progeny make patent, 
the standard is intended as a kind of warning to the federal 
courts to give legislatures the benefit of the doubt. It is thus 
consistent with familiar canons of statutory interpretation 
and constitutional adjudication stating that legislatures are 
rational bodies that intend to function within their powers 
to enact lawful measures. In cases in which there is little 
doubt, however, there is no benefit to give. 
 
Here, there is little doubt. As Part I.C. makes clear, 
notification measures have historically been considered 
punitive. As Part I.D. makes clear, the particular design of 
 
                                100 
notification under Megan's Law in no way contradicts this 
history. And, as Part II makes clear, the effects of 
notification measures suggest strongly their punitive 
nature; the majority's efforts to dilute the Artway effects 
prong, see supra Part II, are unavailing. Taking the 
foregoing factors together, then, I conclude that sufficient 
proof of an objective punitive intent motivating the 
notification provisions of Megan's Law exists to negate the 




We should and do endeavor mightily to protect our 
children from the dangers of the modern world. There is, 
however, a background risk of violence from which we 
simply cannot shield them. I believe that the New Jersey 
legislature desperately wanted to do all that it could to 
prevent the murder of any child at the hands of a released 
sex offender. But, if a released sex offender is intent on 
repeating his offense, there is no reason to believe he will 
necessarily limit himself to his surrounding community (or, 
for that matter, limit himself to his state). 
 
Unfortunate though it may be, dangers to our children 
can come from anywhere. People in the community, 
especially parents, therefore justifiably warn children more 
sternly about interacting with strangers, wandering too far 
from home, staying out past dark, etc. There is no way to 
determine how many crimes will be prevented by all of the 
Megan's Laws throughout the country. I suspect, however, 
that the change in protection secured by notification will be 
marginal at best. Query whether this marginal change is 
worth tampering with "an essential thread in the mantle of 
protection that the law affords the individual citizen." Lynce 
v. Mathis, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 891, 895 (1997) 
(discussing that group of constitutional provisions 
protecting against the retroactive application of new laws). 
 
It is instructive to note that this issue bears a similarity 
to the challenge the Supreme Court recently faced in Reno 
v. ACLU, 65 U.S.L.W. 4715 (U.S. June 24, 1997) (No. 96- 
511). There, underlying the Court's decision to strike down 
key provisions of a statute purporting to rid the Internet of 
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obscenity is the notion that vital constitutional protections 
must not be swept away in the understandable fervor to 
protect our children. Basic constitutional rights 
fundamental to ordered liberty, like the freedom of speech 
and the right to be free from the retroactive application of 
the laws, impose on each of us certain burdens. We will 
remain a free people only so long as we accept those 
burdens, even in the face of the very safety of our children. 
Recognizing the rights of released sex offenders, 
unpalatable though that may be, is one of them. 
 
Although I am outvoted on the double jeopardy/ex post 
facto issue, I am at least comforted by our holding that the 
notification machinery, with all of its attendant 
consequences, will not be triggered without the significant 
safeguard of requiring the state to establish the case for 
notification by clear and convincing evidence. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
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